ISSN 2078-9823 (Print), ISSN 2587-7879 (Online)

DOI: 10.24412/2078-9823.070.025.202502.110-127

УДК 94(55)

Ruslan Sh. Mamedov1, Danil R. Zakiev2

1,2 Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences  (Moscow, Russia)

1 e-mail: rshmamedov@yandex.ru

2 e-mail:danzakiev63@gmail.com

 

Formation and Development of the Iraqi Army in the Context of the Crisis of 2003–2017

 

Abstract

Introduction. In this article the authors consider the issue of building a new Iraqi Army after its liquidation in 2003 as a result of the occupation of Iraq by the US-led coalition forces. The study of the problems of military security in Iraq becomes relevant in the context of continuing threats of international terrorism and extremism in the Middle East region. The study of the post-Saddam Iraqi army will shed light on the process of formation and evolution of the army in a multi-component society with a government dependent on the occupation forces. The authors also attempt to identify the specifics of the Iraqi government’s policy of reforming the army after the 2014 crisis and before the defeat of ISIS in 2017, as well as examine the government’s policy towards the revival of the defense industrial complex.

Materials and Methods. The methodological concept of our study is the systemic approach, which focuses on the individual elements of the identified problems in their interrelationship and the impact of external conditions on them. Accordingly, the Iraqi armed forces are placed in the context of the socio-political development of the country in the period after the overthrow of the regime of President Saddam Hussein in 2003. The article is also based on the method of analyzing documents (in English and Arabic) and on some works of domestic and foreign authors related to the problems of post-conflict reconstruction of the armed forces.

Results. The new Iraqi Army after 2003 experienced a management crisis caused by the previous regime’s banning of the army and the lack of an appropriate level of strategic thinking among post-Saddam politicians and military officers. Senior and junior commanders were often selected according to the principle of ‘muhasa taifiyya’, or quota seats based on ethno-religious characteristics, their weight and agreements between Iraqi communities. The process of rebuilding the army was steady but very slow (this was also influenced by the fact that mobilized soldiers were mostly part of a new parallel structure, the Popular Militia Forces, from 2014). Iraq continued to be heavily dependent on imports, both of arms and ammunition and of component materials. Despite significant industry successes in areas such as the repair of armoured vehicles and artillery systems, as of 2017, the Iraqi authorities have been unsuccessful in launching mass production of ammunition. Nevertheless, the authors document the strengthening of Iraq’s security forces, including the army, amid the victory over ISIS.

Discussion and Conclusion. In Iraq, after the US invasion in 2003, no real attempt was made to build effective state structures that would meet the needs of the new stage of political development. The Iraqi government de-facto set the main tasks of the Iraqi army as combating terrorists and ensuring internal security. The emergence of IS put the established Iraqi institutions – first of all, the institutions of the security system – to another test by 2014. The Iraqi Army emerged victorious in the fight against IS, but competition with other – and newly formed – security institutions increased, which determined the further development of the country’s armed forces.

Keywords: Iraqi Armed Forces, Iraqi Security forces, Defense industry of Iraq, modernization of the Iraqi army, military expenditures of Iraq, Iraqi Arms imports.

For citation: Mamedov R. Sh., Zakiev D. R. Formation and Development of the Iraqi Army in the Context of the Crisis of 2003–2017. Gumanitarian: aktual’nye problemy gumanitarnoi nauki i obrazovaniia = Russian Journal of the Humanities. 2025; 25(2): 110–127. (In Russ.). DOI: 10.24412/2078-9823.070.025.202502.110-127.

 

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